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1. The Ukrainian conflict: “a war about identity and sovereignty” 
This case study focuses on the analysis of the linguistic means used in three 
audio-visual news outlets to refer to and describe the events concerning the 
Ukrainian conflict. Before considering the methods, data and results of this case 
study, I would like to briefly examine the context in which the events of the 
Ukrainian conflict unfolded. To do so, I will provide a brief summary of them 
considering the ceasefire negotiations of February 2015 as the main turning point 
in the conflict.  
There are two main events that led to this conflict: the “Euromaidan” revolution 
and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian federation. Both have strong 
cultural and geopolitical implications, which are important when dealing with the 
overall evolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. 
The “Euromaidan” revolution was run by the namesake movement, which was 
born in November 2013 and advocated for Ukrainian integration into the 
European Union. This movement aroused civil unrest in Ukraine especially 
towards the then President Viktor Yanukovych, who, being very close to the 
Russian Federation, was against the “Europeanization" of Ukraine and whose 
election was tarnished with criticism due to suspicions of rigging and corruption.  
As a reaction to these suspicions, the “Euromaidan” movement organised 
protests against the government, culminating in the Euromaidan or Ukrainian 
revolution around mid-February 2014. The core of the protests took place in Kiev, 
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where protesters and riot police clashed heavily and blood was shed under the 
receptive eye of international media which reported repeated infringements of 
human rights at the expense of the pro-Europe protesters. 
Under the pressure of European leaders’ mediating effort, President Yanukovych 
made concessions to protesters in order to end the so called crisis and, on 21st 
February 2014, signed together with the opposition the “Agreement on settlement 
of the political crisis in Ukraine”1 at the presence of Polish, German and French 
Foreign Ministers. On that occasion, Vladimir Lukin, the Russian special envoy, 
refused to sign the agreement. Shortly after, Yanukovych fled the country and 
sought asylum in Russia. Protesters took over and established a pro-European 
government, removing Yanukovych from office and announcing a forthcoming 
presidential election, which resulted in Petro Poroshenko being elected President 
on 25th May 2014. 
The ousting of Viktor Yanukovich ignited reactions in Crimea2, a country on which 
the Russian Federation was looking forward to reaffirming its presence. 
Therefore, a few weeks after the “Euromaidan” revolution and Yanukovich’s 
ousting, unidentified militaries took over the Crimean parliament, and Crimea 
declared its independence from Ukraine. Then, on 16th March 2014, it requested 
to be annexed to the Russian Federation through a referendum, which bore the 
suspiciously stunning result of 96.7% “yes”. 
This event comprehensibly raised concerns among the international community, 
who saw this as an extension of Russia’s imperialistic aims. Ukraine did not 
recognize the vote as rightful; the United Nations and major international 
interlocutors, such as the European Union and the United States, also deemed it 
unlawful, and Russia was sanctioned for its annexation of Crimea.  
As a result, the situation within Ukrainian borders became fragile and unstable. 
Allegedly, it was the Crimean vote that inspired revolts and uprisings by 
separatists in the Donbass region. The tension eventually erupted and the fighting 
 
1 The Ukraine Crisis Timeline. Retrieved May 31, 2019, from http://ukraine.csis.org/kyiv.htm#9. 
2 Crimea was an independent republic under Ukrainian aegis, it presents a complex ethnic 
situation with more than 70% of Crimeans identifying themselves as Russian, the rest of the 
population as Ukrainian and Tatar. 
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started in April 2014. Even though Russia was proved to be actively supporting 
the far-right separatists in the fighting, the Russian Federation never publicly 
admitted to it (Kovalov 2014). NATO did not intervene in Poroshenko’s favour, for 
two main reasons: firstly, because Ukraine is not part of NATO3, secondly 
because this conflict was labelled as an internal or civil war by (Western) 
international agenda setters.  
In the vain effort of discouraging Russia, the UN repeatedly sanctioned the 
Russian Federation and the EU sent emissaries and mediators; however, no 
military action was taken by the West. Western politics and media monitored the 
conflict, occasionally intervening and mediating to promote a ceasefire between 
separatists and Ukrainian government forces. 
The violence escalated in the Donbass until a first ceasefire was reached in 
September 2014. This agreement was not effective, violence escalated again to 
the point that on 22nd January 2015 the separatists gained control over the 
strategic outpost of Debaltseve and its airport. A second ceasefire deal was 
agreed upon between President Poroshenko and President Putin, who was 
vouching for the separatists, although continuing to deny Russia’s involvement in 
the conflict. This second ceasefire was watched closely by European foreign 
ministers, who were also witnessing its signing. Furthermore, the then President 
of the United States, Barak Obama, threatened to “[consider] giving weapons to 
the Ukrainian government forces”, should diplomacy fail. 
After the second ceasefire, the attention western media paid to the Ukrainian 
conflict seems to have gradually decreased. However, OCSE is monitoring the 
conflict4 which is currently evolving and includes a line of fire and trenches 
between Ukrainian government forces and separatists in eastern Ukraine5.  
As pointed out above, this conflict was labelled and framed as civil war from its 
outset, especially to justify and explain NATO and EU’s non-interventionist 
 
3 NATO member countries. Retrieved May 31, 2019, from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm  
4 Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Retrieved May 31, 2019, from 
https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine  
5 UNIAN Information Agency, War section. Retrieved May 31, 2019 from  
https://www.unian.info/war 
4 
attitude. Even though this label might seem suitable and convenient for the West, 
it has a reason to be. Indeed, this conflict involves the definition of a national pro-
Western Ukrainian identity opposed to an Eastern Ukrainian identity or, as it has 
been defined by the media, pro-Russian identity of the separatists from the 
Donbass region, ultimately configuring itself as “a war about identities and 
sovereignty” (Ian Pannell, BBC Weekend News Afternoon, 15/02/2015, 
00:08:10). These labels referring to the conflict and its actors play a key role in 
defining the Ukrainian identity and the war itself on both sides, the West and 
Russia (Makarychev 2014), as I will try to demonstrate in this case study. 
In connection to this, Fedor and Pavlyshyn6 reported how Western media 
disregarded and silenced the Ukrainian perspective on “Russian hybrid warfare”, 
which led to ignore Ukraine’s claims in this conflict and eventually strengthened 
Russia-backed separatists’ ones. According to them, the Russian media labelled 
the conflict as “new Cold War” in order to manipulate Russian audiences and 
reinforce the idea that Russia is at war with the West, while distracting Russian 
viewers and readers from internal issues that are affecting their daily lives, such 
as embargos and international sanctions.  
This is confirmed in Kovalov’s work on the three competing narratives underlying 
the eastern Ukrainian conflict (2014). Kovalov demonstrates how Russian media 
employed the “domestic causes”, “Russia-centric” and “Western fault” narratives 
to persuade viewers that the Euromaidan revolution was supported by far-right 
groups and backed up by the US, and that the European and US interference in 
these matters brought both to Euromaidan and to the annexation of Crimea.  
Furthermore, Kovalov suggests that, by employing the “Russia-centric” narrative, 
“Russia engaged in a modern type of warfare through limited military action, 
strong domestic media support and political muscle” (Kovalov 2014: 147).  
While I do not have the necessary linguistic skills to verify these issues in Russian 
media outlets, I intend to verify the presence of labels and/or polarizing attitudes 
 
6 Monash European and EU Centre, LLCL – The Geopolitics of Eastern Europe Today: The Case 
of Ukraine. (2016, October 23). Retrieved May 31, 2019, from 
http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/events/events/monash- european-and-eu-centre-llcl-the-
geopolitics-of-eastern-europe-today-the-case-of-ukraine/. 
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representing similar narratives within my dataset.  
These points are pivotal to frame the analysis that follows, as they hint at how 
language transfer, i.e. translation, can be used to support or dismiss views and 
claims on either side of the conflict. In fact, translation is a form of “relayed 
communication” (Baker 2006), but it also “appears as the arena par excellence 
to reconfigure and ‘reframe’ existing discourse through more or less subtle shifts” 
(Spiessens and Van Poucke 2016: 322). 
 
2. Methodology: corpus-based cross-linguistic analysis of audio-visual 
news outlets 
This case study analyses the reporting of the Ukrainian conflict in 2015 within 
audio-visual news cross-linguistically; it employs a (sub-)corpus of newscast 
transcriptions of three news providers (Rai, BBC and Euronews), which will be 
referred to as AVNews Corpus (whole corpus; see Aragrande 2018) and UKR-
sub-corpus (partition used in this study).  
By exploring keyword lists and extended concordance lines, this paper intends to 
shed light on how the Ukrainian conflict and its actors were labelled by these 
broadcasters in order to verify whether Western media promoted a polarized 
narrative of the war or not. 
Before describing the dataset employed in this study, some information about the 
AVNews corpus is provided. This corpus was built during the course of my Ph.D., 
whose aim was to grasp the complexities and ramifications of different forms of 
journalism (i.e. broadcasting, online, written and a mix of the three) in different 
national, supranational and international contexts (i.e. in Italy, the UK, Europe, 
Australia and on the Internet), by merging different methodological approaches 
in what I defined as convergence framework (Aragrande 2016).  
As table 1 shows, the AVNews Corpus consists of three sub-corpora of 
transcribed newscasts (RAI and BBC) and video news (Euronews). This audio-
visual corpus is therefore rather small, but it is possible to consider it as a 
specialized corpus (Haarman and Lombardo 2009: 9) since it focuses on a 
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specific genre (i.e. audio-visual journalism). What is more, the AVNews corpus 
comprises a so-called thematic tagging which allows the analyst to isolate 
components according to a specific topic (e.g. Ukraine).  
 
 Channels and newscast typologies 
Time span 
9-22 Feb. 
2015 + 6-16 
Aug. 2015 
Rai Uno – 8 pm 
newscast 
Rainews24 – 1 
and 3 pm 
newscasts 
Euronews – online 
video news (English 
and Italian Euronews’ 
website) 
BBC One – 6 and 8 
pm newscasts 
Type of 
corpus 
Monolingual (IT), 
comparable 
Bilingual (IT, EN), 
comparable 
Monolingual (EN), 
comparable 
No. Of 
tokens 
204,369 (Rai Uno 
91,941; Rainews 
112,428) 
104,689 
(IT 51,340, EN 
53,349) 
115,614 
Table 1. AVNews Corpus sources and time span 
 
The two monolingual components of the AVNews Corpus are thought to be 
representative of the two nationalities of the broadcasters (Italian or British). 
Therefore the latter address their respective audiences, who primarily identify 
with those nationalities in inherently and almost exclusively monolingual media 
settings. The two monolingual components thus represent a national stance on 
the news from the point of view of two public broadcasters. 
I chose to employ public broadcasters because they are supposed to share the 
same mission and purpose, moreover they are widely available and easily 
accessible. Despite the profound difference between them especially in terms of 
management, I believe that using BBC and RAI is the most straightforward way 
to compare Italy’s and the UK’s broadcast journalism. 
Similarly to Rainews24, Euronews is a rolling news (web-)channel and it mainly 
appeals to a European audience. It is one of the few channels in the world that 
not only broadcasts news in many languages without holding any particular 
national affiliation, but also (and more importantly) provides the same audio-
visual material in all the languages comprised in their services, thus providing a 
great deal of research material for academics interested in investigating language 
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transfer processes in the news.  
As a concluding remark of this section, I would like to briefly comment on the 
ownership of the three broadcasters considered in this study. On the one hand, 
BBC and RAI are public broadcasters fulfilling, albeit with substantial differences, 
their mandate towards the audience. Both are sustained by public money and 
license fees, and this assures a good degree of comparability of the purposes of 
this study.  
On the other hand, Euronews represents a hybrid situation. Indeed, since 2015 it 
was acquired by Media Global Networks, which currently owns 53% of the 
network. The remaining 47% is shared among its NBC Universal (25%) and 
European public broadcasters (22% - among which RAI).   
I am well aware of the huge diversity of the three sources informing the AVNews 
corpus, nonetheless, when I was building the corpus, those broadcasters 
represented a suitable compromise for achieving a high degree of comparability 
among its components.  
 
3. Sub-corpora and keywords: a starting point for understanding actors in 
and defining the Ukrainian conflict 
In this section, I will discuss some of the results of the analysis I carried out using 
the UKR_sub-corpus with two main aims: first, to verify the existence of a 
polarized portrayal of the Ukrainian conflict; second, to compare the attitude of 
the three newscasters towards the Ukrainian crisis and its actors. 
Starting from the assumption that audio-visual news is one of the most powerful 
tools for disseminating and propagating stances over a news item, I believe the 
eastern Ukrainian conflict to be a widely discussed topic not only in Europe, but 
also at a global level, since peace in Europe was at stake. Moreover, the topic of 
the Ukrainian conflict did not directly involve Italy nor the UK (or the European 
Union), allowing thus for a comparison of linguistic and journalistic contents 
starting from a similarly distant position. 
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Therefore, I decided to focus on this topic because of its prominence in the media 
agenda in general, and in my dataset in particular. Indeed, thanks to the thematic 
tagging of AVNews Corpus, I was able to build the UKR_sub-corpus, which 
consists of three separate comparable sub-corpora7 comprising news reports 
about Ukraine, and to compare them against the main audio-visual sub-corpora.  
Table 2 contains information about the frequency of the tag <topic 
item=“Ukraine”>, which was used to build the sub-corpora. Dividing AVNews 
Corpus using the thematic tagging I obtained the three UKR_sub-corpora, which 
are composed as shown in Table 3. 
 
Rainews 24 Rai Uno Euronews IT Euronews EN BBC One 
4.4% 2% 6% 6% 4% 
Table 2. <topic item= “Ukraine”> frequency in % in the AVNews Corpus 
 
Rai Euronews IT Euronews EN BBC One 
Rainews 24 Rai Uno 
13 reports, 
10 headlines 
5 reports, 
3 headlines 
20 reports 20 reports 12 reports,  
7 headlines 
Tokens 6,907 Tokens 1,855 Tokens 4,225 Tokens 4,097 Tokens 5,119 
Table 3. UKR_sub-corpora information 
 
The three UKR sub-corpora were compared against the main AVNews corpus in 
order to extract keywords: Tables 4 and 5 show the top 20 keywords found in 
each sub-corpus. Being the sub-corpora rather small, minimum frequency of 
occurrence was set at five occurrences and the keywords were calculated using 
AntConc (Anthony 2014). As we can see, there are many shared keywords 
across the sub-corpora. In order to investigate how the conflict was framed and 
“translated” by the news channels for their respective audiences, it is worth 
looking closely at words expressing nationalities or qualifying actors in the news 
reports (e.g. Ukrainian, separatists, etc.). 
 
7 For the purposes of this study Rainews and Rai Uno were considered as one sub-corpus since 
they are part of the same network and thus share a similar view on the Ukrainian crisis. However, 
it would be technically possible to consider them separately. 
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UKR_Rai  UKR_EuronewsIT 
Raw f. Keyness Keyword Rank Raw f. Keyness Keyword 
64 233.186 Ucraina  1.  31  67.831 Ucraina 
53 196.532 Filo 2.  20  52.661  Kiev  
44 170.452 Russi  3.  20  52.661  Separatisti 
38 147.950 Minsk 4.  16  41.891  Donetsk 
33 129.421 Kiev 5.  17  39.252  Ribelli  
27 103.17  Ucraino  6.  14 37.715  Minsk  
25 95.260 Prigionieri 7.  12 29.998 Ucraino 
25 92.918  Putin  8.  11  29.633 Poroshenko 
21 76.057  Cessate 9.  10 26.939  Osce 
19 75.263  Donetsk 10.  11  26.270  Cessate  
23 74.269  Est 11.  11  25.285  Tregua  
21 72.961 Soldati  12.  12 23.640  Russi 
19 71.542 Poroshenko 13.  8  21.551  Debaltseve  
23 70.996  Merkel 14.  7  18.857  Starkov  
20 70.056  Tregua  15.  8  17.391 Filo 
22 68.012 Russia  16.  6  16.163  Accordi 
17 67.340  Ucraini  17.  6  16.163  Filorussi 
15 58.137 Debaltseve  18.  6  16.163  Mariupol 
18 56.887  Esercito 19.  10 16.064 Armi 
24 56.149  Fuoco 20.  12 15.981  Fuoco 
Table 4. Italian UKR Sub-Corpora, Keyword lists 
 
UKR_BBC  UKR_EuronewsEN 
Raw f. Keyness Keyword Rank Raw f. Keyness Keyword 
39 140.38 Ukraine 1.  40 95.462  Ukraine 
26 98.787  Ukrainian 2.  21  52.502  Ceasefire 
21 80.831  Ceasefire 3.  20 50.886 Ukrainian 
19 73.133  Debaltseve 4.  17 46.246 Kiev 
22 65.630  Town 5.  23  38.613  Russian 
21 62.754  Russian 6.  14  38.085  Donetsk 
23 62.080  Eastern 7.  12  32.645  Osce 
15 56.460  Rebels 8.  14  29.930  Rebels 
15 55.244  Sides 9.  14 26.819  Conflict 
15 51.909  Rebel 10.  14  25.433  Eastern 
18 50.408  Russia 11.  9 24.483 Debaltseve 
13 50.038 Donetsk 12.  9 24.483  Minsk 
16 45.356  Peace 13.  16 24.308 Peace 
21 41.548  War 14.  7 19.043 Shelling 
10 38.491  Shells 15.  9  18.538  Rebel 
16 35.950  Both 16.  7 16.806  Separatists 
9 33.386  Merkel 17.  6 16.322 Luhansk 
12 33.145  Fighting 18.  6 16.322 Poroshenko 
12 29.443  Army 19.  6 16.322  Separatist 
9 29.193  Obama 20.  6  16.322  Starkov 
Table 5. English UKR Sub-Corpora, keyword lists 
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Focusing on the keywords describing and qualifying actors in the reports, we can 
note how “rebel*”/“ribell*” features in UKR_BBC, UKR_Euronews_EN and 
UKR_Euronews_IT while it is not prominent in UKR_RAI, where “separatist*” 
does not come up as salient either. This difference across the four UKR 
comparable sub-corpora, is surely worth examining. Therefore, looking at the 
frequencies of “ribell*” and “separatist*” across the different corpora can be 
instructive and give us a more detailed picture of the situation, as Table 6 shows. 
 
 Separatist*/Separatist* Rebel*/Ribell* 
Raw  Norm. Raw  Norm. 
UKR_RAI 11 1.59 21 2.8 
UKR_EuronewsIT 24 6.37 17 4.51 
UKR_EuronewsEN 13 3.52 23 6.23 
UKR_BBC 3 0.74 30 6.67 
Table 6. Raw and normalised (p1000w) frequencies of “separatist*”/“separatist*” and 
“rebel*”/“ribell*” in the UKR sub-corpora 
 
Although the UKR_RAI keyword list does not show “ribell*” and “separatist*” as 
particularly salient words, they are quite frequent in this sub-corpus. “Ribell*” 
seems the preferred option within the UKR_RAI sub-corpus, while the 
UKR_EuronewsIT sub-corpus seems to favour “separatist*” over “ribell*”. In the 
English sub-corpora, we observe instead a preference for “rebel*” over 
“separatist*” that is more evident, in terms of frequency, in the UKR_BBC sub-
corpus than in the UKR_EuronewsEN one. 
The use of “rebel*” and “separatist*” (as nouns and adjectives) appears to shift 
from one Euronews sub-corpus to the other, hence it is worth looking at the 
concordance lines of both lemmas in the UKR_Euronews sub-corpora, as well as 
in the other UKR_sub-corpora, in order to have a clearer picture. Given the size 
of the UKR_Euronews sub-corpora, I decided to manually analyse their 
concordance lines in order to highlight patterns in the immediate co-texts of the 
node. 
Tables 7 and 8 contain the concordance lines of “rebel*”/ “ribell*” from the two 
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Euronews sub-corpora. In both sub-corpora, the noun “rebel*”/ “ribell*” is often 
preceded or followed by the adjective “pro-Russian” or “filo-russ*”, frequently in 
opposition to the internationally recognized Ukrainian government led by Petro 
Poroshenko. In the UKR_EuronewsEN sub-corpus “rebel*” is also found in the 
participial compound “rebel-held” followed by a noun indicating a place (e.g. 
Table 4 lines 7, 8, and 20). In both UKR_Euronews sub-corpora “rebel*”/ “ribell*”, 
in object position, are objects of accusations, whereas “rebel*”/ “ribell*” in subject 
position are often denying or confirming something, such as attacks or adherence 
to ceasefire deals. 
 
1  fighting escalates between 
government troops and  
rebels in eastern Ukraine, despite the February  
2  across Ukraine with both government 
and  
rebels launching offensives to gain ground ahead  
3  of July.  Kiev says shelling by  rebels over the last 24 hours is the  
4  months as well as fresh fighting.   rebels have accused government troops of 
increased 
5  Kiev’s military reported the heaviest  rebels artillery attack in six months as  
6  fragile truce appears to be holding.   rebels are now in control here and  
7  shell hit a bus station in  Rebel -held Donetsk.  The body of a  
8  to the village of Yasne, in  Rebel -held territory, but lost his way  
9  separatist eastern regions as 
alarming.  one  
Rebel official is warning of the threat  
10  a ceasefire deal being in place. 400  Rebel fighters, backed by tanks, attacked 
government 
11   Representatives of Russia, Ukraine, 
pro Russian  
rebels and the OSCE security watchdog holding  
12  in the week, the pro Russian  rebels captured the town of Debaltseve from  
13  deads.    Ukraine has accused pro 
Russian  
rebels in the east of the country  
14  Donetsk, controlled by the pro 
Russian  
rebels , the guns couldn't fall silent  
15  last?  In ominous remarks, a senior  rebel commander has said that despite the  
16  ose who lost their lives.   Separatist  rebels have said they would begin to  
17  a significant strategic gain for the  rebels because it straddles the railway that  
18  thread, the Ukrainian military said the  rebels continued attacks on their forces near  
19  in the rocket fire.  Though the  rebels denied firing on the city, the  
20  .  In Donetsk, the leader of the  rebel -held region has repeated his call  
21  work impossible for the OSCE.  The  Rebel side ehm would not ehm guarantee  
22  caused by a government missile. The  rebel stronghold lies in the middle of  
23  he pessimism felt in Kiev.       
Ukrainian  
rebels in Donetsk claim an overnight explosion  
Table 7. UKR_EuronewsEN sub-corpus, “rebel*” concordance lines 
12 
1 quelli che combatteranno nelle truppe  ribelli , in tutto questo, la Russia ha  
2  vuole aggredire la pacifica Ucraina.   I  ribelli filo-russi hanno negato di aver lanciato  
3  pare reggere.  Tacciono le armi dei  ribelli filo-russi, come stabilito negli accordi  
4  Russia, non riesce ad arrivare.  I  ribelli non ci garantiscono un passaggio sicuro  
5  e si rifugiò in Russia.        I  ribelli filorussi nell’Ucraina orientale confermano 
6 riupol, dove Kiev denuncia 44 attacchi  ribelli nelle ultime 24 ore.  Lo scambio di  
7  , con la cattura da parte dei  ribelli della città di Debaltseve.       Qu 
8  di accuse tra Kiev e i  ribelli .   Kiev ha parlato di un attacco  
9  con carri armati da parte di 400  ribelli filo-russi nella città di Starohnativka,  
10  , ultimo bastione dei governativi. 
Smentiscono i  
ribelli che puntano il dito contro le  
11  e di accuse tra ucraini e  ribelli filo-russi, in un crescendo che  
12  strada tra Donetsk, la roccaforte dei  ribelli , e la città portuale di Mariupol.   
13  .  L’esercito ucraino ha accusato i  ribelli di aver attaccato le truppe regolari  
14  immediatamente da contraltare il 
negoziatore dei  
ribelli , che ha ribaltato l’accusa.    Sfortun 
15  situazione creatasi con gli attacchi ai  ribelli filo-russi e alla popolazione dell’ 
16  il villaggio di Yasne, controllato dai  ribelli .   Non conoscendo la zona, è però  
17  russo, e di munizioni destinate ai  ribelli .   Queste armi non sono prodotte in  
Table 8. UKR_EuronewsIT sub-corpus, “ribel*” concordance lines 
 
In lines 16 and 23 of Table 7, “rebel*” is preceded by “separatist” and “Ukrainian” 
respectively. This rather contradictory choice of adjectives feeds into the 
terminological imprecision with which separatists are addressed by the media; 
however, it is worth mentioning that the UKR_EuronewsEN is the only sub-corpus 
in which the national label of “Ukraine” is associated with the insurgents. Despite 
this, those flagged as rebels or separatists are frequently described with the label 
of pro-Russian, as the following concordance lines of “separatist*” from 
UKR_Euronews sub-corpora suggest (Table 9, lines 8, 9, 10; Table 10 lines 1, 2, 
9, 13, 15, 16, 22 and 23). 
Among the concordance lines in Tables 9 and 10 we can observe again how 
words referring to the internationally-recognised Ukrainian government occur in 
the immediate co-text of “separatist*”, reinforcing the polarity (Ukrainian vs. non-
Ukrainian/pro-Russian, East vs. West) of the conflict. Interestingly, this 
polarization takes up yet another nuance in the UKR_EuronewsIT sub-corpus, 
where “separatisti” are met by “lealisti” (loyalists) on the other end of the conflict, 
this time contrasting loyal and lawful vs. disloyal and unlawful. 
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1  deal was signed seven months ago.  Separatist commanders, however, have denied  
2  been killed though says Kiev, blaming  Separatists for isolated incidents.  In Luhansk r 
3  mission. The OSCE has accused both  Separatists and Ukrainian troops of failing to  
4 have described the recent escalation in  Separatist eastern regions as alarming. one re 
5  to those who lost their lives.        Separatist rebels have said they would begin  
6  a pocket between the two main  Separatist controlled regions. Nine Ukrainian tr 
7  coastal town of Mariupol, to relieve  Separatist pressure on Debaltseve.  It's been  
8 ombardment. Ukraine and pro-Russian Separatists are accusing each other of attemptin 
9  it is our territory.         Pro Russian  Separatist soldiers have been celebrating in th 
10  crossing from Russia to reinforce the  Separatists in clear breach of the truce  
11  he was recruited to assist the  Separatists on Ukranian territory.  Vladimir Star 
12  he was supposed to deliver to  Separatists .  These kinds of weapons aren’t  
13  of peace talks in Minsk tomorrow.   Separatists have pushed to cut off a  
Table 9. UKR_EuronewsEN sub-corpus “separatist*” concordance lines 
 
1  di tagliare i rifornimenti russi ai  Separatisti che Mosca ha mostrato di non  
2  dalla Russia per portare rinforzi ai  Separatisti . Per completare questa fase, sono 
3  delle sponde perfino in alcuni ambiti  Separatisti . Dobbiamo introdurre dei contingen 
4 er una maggiore autonomia delle aree  Separatiste sudorientali.        Un’esplos 
5  pace e prosperità. I conflitti coi  Separatisti nell'est hanno relegato in secondo  
6  cambiato. Debaltseve, i combattenti  Separatisti pattugliano le strade della città orie 
7  è quello di Debaltseve, circondato dai  Separatisti . Gli abitanti continuano ad 
abbandona 
8  restare soltanto loro, circondati dai  Separatisti .   La diplomazia non fa passi avanti 
9  inviare a combattere a fianco dei  Separatisti filo-russi.  Vladimir Starkov è stat 
10  una centrale chimica nelle mani dei  Separatisti .  Il risultato è stato una gigantesca 
11  Donetsk e Luhansk. L'obiettivo dei  Separatisti ora è lo strategico porto marittimo  
12  smentite di Mosca.  L'avanzata dei  Separatisti è stata accelerata dalla conquista di  
13  fronte dei combattimenti tra esercito e  Separatisti filo-russi, Kharkiv è controllata dal g 
14  cessate il fuoco di febbraio fra  Separatisti e lealisti continuano gli scambi di  
15  due, le forze ucraine e i  Separatisti filo-russi si accusano a vicenda.  
16  ha lanciato un’offensiva contro i  Separatisti filo-russi vicino a Mariupol, nel 
sudes 
17  Donetsk. Unendo Lugansk e Donetsk, 
i  
Separatisti hanno realizzato la continuità territo 
18  che l’esercito regolare e i  Separatisti intendano rispettare i patti. Ma il  
19  'onda degli ultimi successi militari, i  Separatisti ora cercano di dettare il calendario  
20  dozzina di zone calde nelle regioni  Separatiste di Donetsk e Luhansk. L'obiettivo  
21  l'Ucraina e le autoproclamate 
repubbliche  
Separatiste , ma anche le frontiere fra queste  
22  nella guerra che oppone da tempo  Separatisti filo-russi e governo di Kiev. Lo  
23  ria pesante.  Rappresentanti di 
Russia, Ucraina,  
separatisti filo-russi e dell'OSCE, hanno reso  
24  li abbiamo completamente circondati.  
Dice un  
Separatista . Questa sconfitta, tenuta segreta fin 
Table 10. UKR_EuronewsIT sub-corpus “separatist*” concordance lines 
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Shifting the focus to the other sub-corpora, UKR_BBC and UKR_RAI present the 
same pattern linking the noun “rebel*”/ “ribell*” to the adjective “pro-Russian”/ 
“filoruss*” or to the participial compound “Russian-backed” in pre- and post-
attributive position witnessed to in Euronews sub-corpora. Here, “rebel*” as well 
as “separatist*” appear, so to speak, in “Russian company” and often in 
opposition to Ukrainian institutions, such as the government, Kiev, or the army. 
 
1  a western leaning government 
against a  
Rebel army that turns to its Russian  
2  a western leaning government 
against a  
Rebel army that turns to its Russian  
3  may be held here at a  Rebel building in Donetsk.   The fate of  
4  thanks God they're still alive.    Rebel leaders say they'll stick to  
5  thanks God they're still alive.    Rebel leaders say they'll stick to  
6  .   Both Ukrainian forces and Russian 
backed  
Rebels say they will honour the ceasefire  
7  in the hands of Russian backed  Rebels .   The key railway hub has endured  
8  town which fell to Russian backed  Rebels this week, our correspondent is there.    
9  battles of the entire war.   Here  Rebels corralled the defeated government 
soldiers. 
10  week. She will stay here in  Rebel held territory until that happens. James  
11  , has made the journey alone into  Rebel held territory to get her husband  
12  husband.     On the 21st of January,  Rebel fighters took Donetsk Airport in one  
13  been heavy shelling around the mail  Rebel held city of Donietsk, with no  
14  in the fighting between pro-Russian  Rebels rebels and Ukrainian government forces. 
Prisoners  
15  Kiev should try to re-take  Rebel held areas.    If Ukrainian troops will  
16  , the Ukrainian army fought off the  Rebel advance for weeks.   Three days ago  
17  , the Ukrainian army fought off the  Rebel advance for weeks.   Three days ago  
18  troops and armour to help the  Rebels , an allegation Moscow denies.    But th 
19  troops and armour to help the  Rebels , an allegation Moscow denies.    But the 
20  shelling have taken their toll.   The  Rebels are everywhere, but the town is  
21  shelling have taken their toll.   The  Rebels are everywhere, but the town is  
22  are the young men of the  Rebel army.   This crisis is escalating at  
23  are the young men of the  Rebel army.    This crisis is escalating at  
24  correspondent Ian Pannell reports 
from the  
Rebel held town of Donetsk.     Ukraine's  
25  between the Ukrainian government 
and the  
Rebels here, it will have to include  
26  a half uprooted.    These are the  Rebels , pro-Russian and battling government's  
27  a hald uprooted.    These are the  Rebels , pro-Russian and battling government's  
28  swap. Both the government and the  Rebels promised a quick release of the  
29   In eastern Ukraine,  Rebels parade and humiliate captured army 
soldiers 
30  the road out of Debaltseve, victorious  Rebels are leaving their job done.   They' 
Table 11. UKR_BBC sub-corpus, “rebel*” concordance lines 
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1  e Luhansk, le due città  Ribelli , è caduta.    Ciao Poroshenko , dice  
2  prigionieri.   Ma questi, esibiti dai  Ribelli a Donetsk come i 90 di  
3  collegamento le due aree dai  Ribelli controllate, cioè Donetsk e Luhansk,  
4  mare, le città capoluogo della  Ribellione , Luhansk e Donetsk.   Come potete  
5  città con Donetsk capoluogo della  Ribellione .   Una fragile tregua sulla cui  
6  scambiati con una cinquantina di  Ribelli filo-russi.   Nella fredda notte  
7  ritirato e, secondo Kiev, i  Ribelli attaccano alle porte di Mariupol,  
8  ucraino Poroshenko, anche se i  Ribelli filo-russi negano qualsiasi attribuzione,  
9  morti e feriti. Ma i  Ribelli filo-russi chiamati in causa  
10  forze di Kiev e i  Ribelli filo-russi nell'est dell' 
11  l'esercito ucraino che i  Ribelli filo-russi accusano il ehm  
12  'esercito ucraino sostiene che i  Ribelli filo-russi l'abbiano fatto  
13  forze di Kiev e i  Ribelli filo-russi nell'est dell' 
14  nelle ultime 24 ore con i  Ribelli filo-russi e i militari  
15  di Minsk.   Marco Clementi.     I  Ribelli filo-russi festeggiano tra le  
16  Donetsk e Luhansk, mentre i  Ribelli non specificano dove l'esercito  
17  almeno un morto, ma i  Ribelli smentiscono.   Intanto proseguono i prep 
18  i prigionieri dell'altra repubblica  Ribelle .   Per raggiungere un totale di  
19  i prigionieri dell'altra repubblica  Ribelle .   Per raggiungere un totale di  
20  nella terra di nessuno tra  Ribellione filo-russa e ucraina.   Tra  
21  nella terra di nessuno tra  ribellione filo-russa e ucraina.   Tra  
Table 12. UKR_RAI sub-corpus, “ribel*” concordance lines 
 
The concordance lines in Tables 11 and 12 provide further examples of the 
frequent association between Russia and separatists in contrast with the 
Ukrainian government. What appears relevant here, is that the overall dominance 
of “rebel*”/ “ribell*” over “separatist*” across the UKR_BBC and UKR_RAI sub-
corpora suggests that these broadcasters are framing separatists’ claims to their 
autonomy as illegal, and that they are also actively encouraging a polar West vs. 
East framing of the eastern Ukrainian conflict. 
Indeed, according to the OED, a rebel is “a person who rises in opposition or 
armed resistance against an established government or leader”8. In this context, 
“separatist*”, although far from being unproblematic, seems a politically fairer 
term of address for Ukrainian anti-government forces. Moreover, among the 
collocates of both “rebel*” and “separatist*” in all sub-corpora we find a variety of 
 
8 Rebel | Definition of rebel in English by Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved December 10, 2017, from 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/rebel. 
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epithets referring to the Russian Federation (“pro-Russian”/ “filo-russ*”, “Russia”, 
“Moscow”, “Putin”). This suggests that these broadcasters implicitly deny the 
Ukrainian identity of the so-called rebels. 
 
1  over its border with Russia.   The  separatists , backed by Russia, want to 
remain  
2  between government forces and Russian 
backed  
Separatist is largely holding in the east  
3  between government forces and Russia 
backed  
Separatists is largely holding in the east  
Table 13. UKR_BBC sub-corpus “separatist*” concordance lines 
 
1  si abbracciano, sventolano le 
bandiere  
Separatiste separatiste, calpestata quella ucraina.   
Anche 
2  fa un nuovo attacco dei  Separatisti separatisti filo-russi nell'est del  
3  del paese. I razzi dei  Separatisti separatisti filo russi provocano 
almeno 15 morti  
4  un'autonomia spinta, allargata dei  Separatisti separatisti guardano con ovvio, 
evidente e  
5  di prigionieri tra esercito e  Separatisti separatisti filo-russi, ma una bomba  
6  sporadiche manifestazioni nelle 
vicende ehm  
Separatiste separatiste, che sono ehm 
praticamente ehm  
7  i filo-sep e i  Separatisti separatisti filo-russi hanno 
completato lo  
8  conflitto tra Kiev e i  Separatisti separatisti filo-russi. Tutti i fronti  
9  questa città in quel movimento  Separatista separatista filo-russo, che vede 
protagoniste  
10  dell'OSCE e i rappresentanti  Separatisti separatisti per arrivare al vertice di  
11  continuità territoriale fra le 
repubbliche  
Separatiste separatiste di Luhansk e Donetsk e  
Table 14. UKR_RAI sub-corpus “separatist*” concordance line 
 
In line 23 of Table 7 I found the adjective “Ukrainian” occurring with “rebel”. This 
finding posits one further issue, that is to understand who is depicted as 
“Ukrainian” by the four broadcasters. The concordance lines in the Tables above 
suggest that insurgents are not Ukrainians, despite being of Ukrainian descent. 
From this evidence, one could argue that Ukrainians are those who support 
Poroshenkos’s Western-leaning and pro-Europe government. 
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This argument is backed up by evidence from the text. Indeed a search for 
“Ukrain*”/“ucrain*” in the UKR_sub-corpus shows a division between Ukraine and 
its government – with “Ukrainian*”/ “ucrain*” (adjectives) frequently occurring with 
internationally recognised institutions or institutional figures – and eastern 
Ukraine and the separatists (and Russia). 
The item “Ukraine” occurs in the UKR_BBC sub-corpus with a frequency of 14.6 
p1000w, around 30% of the times co-occurring with the adjective “Eastern”, 
signalling that the BBC is indeed constructing the image of (Western) Ukraine in 
opposition to that of Eastern Ukraine. In the UKR_RAI sub-corpus, “Ucraina” has 
a normalised frequency of 6.6, and, around 14% of the times, it occurs with the 
adjectives “est” or “orientale”.  
According to these results, RAI seems to be less consistent in building an image 
of two divided “Ukraines”. However, a closer look at the text and concordance 
lines of “est” in the UKR_RAI sub-corpus reveals that reporters and anchors, in 
order to avoid repeating “Ucraina”, use the term “paese” or simply “est” 
(frequency in the UKR_RAI sub-corpus: 3 p1000w). Furthermore, within the 
UKR_RAI sub-corpus we also find the wording “repubbliche separatiste”. By 
addressing the rebel-held territories as (self-proclaimed) Republics, RAI appears 
to give legitimacy to or, anyway, foster a representation of these areas as officially 
recognized political entities, which is something that none of the other channels 
under study does. 
“Ukraine” in the UKR_EuronewsEN sub-corpus has a normalised frequency of 
10.8 p1000w and occurs with “East” or “Eastern” 25% of the times. However, 
references to Eastern Ukraine are more frequent, as a search for “East*” in the 
sub-corpus gives 27 results, 26 of which referring specifically to Ukraine (thus a 
normalised frequency of 7 p1000w). 
The UKR_EuronewsIT sub-corpus shows a very similar frequency of occurrence 
of the noun “Ucraina” (10.6 p1000w), 17% of the concordance lines of “Ucraina” 
contain either “est” or “orientale”. Similar to RAI, it would seem that the 
UKR_EuronewsIT sub-corpus is less concerned with building two sides of this 
conflict. However, we find that, in order to avoid repetitions, “est” accompanies 
the noun “paese” or “regione” or it is used by itself referring to Ukraine with a 
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frequency of 2.3 p1000w, whereas “orientale” (1.8 p1000w) occurs with 
“Ucraina”, but also with “frontiere” and “città”. 
The UKR_sub-corpora tend to promote a polar vision of the parties involved in 
the conflict, often removing the national label of “Ukrainian” from those who are 
rebelling against the Western-leaning government. However, the corpus analysis 
also showed that this polarization of the parties involved in the conflict is not 
always consistent. We observed how the UKR_BBC sub-corpus tends to 
represent the Ukrainian identity in unity with the Ukrainian official government, 
denying “Ukrainianness” to insurgents and thus feeding this bipolar, almost “Cold 
War”-like, view of the conflict and stigmatizing as illegal and unlawful the 
insurgents’ claims.  
This attitude can be found also in the UKR_RAI and UKR_Euronews (both) sub-
corpora, albeit with some differences. Indeed, I pointed out how Euronews, in 
particular, is the only broadcaster recognizing “Ukrainness” to insurgents, 
whereas RAI tries to legitimize insurgents’ territories by addressing them as 
Republics. Despite these differences, the bipolar display of identities within the 
Ukrainian conflict can be found with varying degrees in the UKR sub-corpus, thus 
promoting a “West vs. East” and/or a “Legal vs. Illegal” representation of its 
actors.  
Once I analysed the actors within the Ukrainian conflict, I moved my attention to 
the labels by which the newscasters defined the conflict itself. Indeed I observed 
how the adjective “Ukrainian” often referred to Western-leaning Ukrainian 
institutions and forces. However, these adjective and genitive prepositions (of/di 
+ Ukraine/Ucraina or the Saxon genitive) are also used to describe and qualify 
other entities in the corpus as Ukrainian. 
Table 15 shows the words that occur with the adjective “Ukrainian” and “ucrain*” 
and those which occur with “Ukraine” and “Ucraina” in the UKR_sub-corpus 
divided according to five categories (Politics, Military, Places, Conflict and 
Miscellaneous).  
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Ukr/Ucr UKR_RAI UKR_EuronewsIT UKR_EuronewsIT UKR_BBC 
Politics President, 
governo, stato 
Cittadini, ministro 
degli esteri, 
governo, stato 
maggiore, 
presidente, 
parlamento 
People, president, 
authorities, leader, 
foreign minister 
Government, 
president 
Military Forze armate, 
esercito, forze, 
milizie, 
prigionieri, 
soldati, truppe 
Esercito, forze, 
esercito regolare, 
Servizi segreti, 
soldati, truppe 
Border patrol, 
troops, rebels, 
government troops 
army, defeat, 
military, security 
service 
Army, armour, 
military, troops, 
soldiers, national 
guard 
Places capitale Frontiera City, territory, 
border, industrial 
heartland 
Capital, city 
Conflict Guerra civile, 
rivoluzione, 
ribellione, crisi, 
situazione, 
conflitto 
Conflitto, crisi, 
Guerra 
(Ukraine’s) conflict, 
crisis, war  
War, conflict (in 
Ukraine) 
Misc.  Notte, bandiera    
Table 15. “Ukrainian”/ “ucrain*” (adj.) and their collocates 
 
While the collocates in the “Politics” and “Military” category are quite predictable, 
those in “Conflict” and “Places” offer a somewhat unexpected starting point for a 
reflection about how the Ukrainian situation was labelled by the four broadcasters 
and how its geography is conveyed to the viewers. Although the striking majority 
of the occurrences of the adjective “Ukrainian” is followed by nouns representing 
official and internationally recognised institutions, on two occasions the BBC 
addresses the situation as “Ukrainian war”, extending the conflict to the whole 
country. The perception of a conflict taking place on the entire Ukrainian soil is 
confirmed in the sentence “Ukraine’s at war with itself” (Ian Pannel, 
150211_BBCOne_NewsAt10, 10:43), which also strengthens the hypothesis that 
the Eastern Ukrainian situation was framed as a civil war by western media. In 
UKR_BBC “war” (4.6 fp1000w) and “conflict” (2.0 fp1000w) are the most frequent 
nouns defining the Ukrainian situation, however “crisis” is also found in the sub-
corpus (0.8 fp1000w), but not in the immediate +/-5 word-span of the 
concordance lines. 
When it comes to defining the Ukrainian situation, RAI seems to be the most 
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creative although not always coherent broadcaster, providing five different 
options: “Guerra civile” (0.26 fp1000w) or simply “Guerra” (2.26 fp1000w), “crisi” 
(1.73 fp1000w), and “conflitto” (1.3 fp1000w), “situazione” (0.13 fp1000w), 
“rivoluzione” (0.13 fp1000w), and “ribellione” (0.53 fp1000w). A closer look at the 
concordance lines shows that “rivoluzione” actually refers to the Maidan 
revolution, whereas the noun “ribellione” occurs both with the noun “Ucraina” and 
the adjective “filorussa”. 
The two most frequent nouns identifying the Ukrainian situation in the UKR_RAI 
sub-corpus are “guerra” and “crisi”. While “guerra” seems an appropriate 
definition of what happened in Ukraine, “crisi” is somehow misleading, as it 
usually defines a temporarily difficult situation (e.g. “crisi dei migranti”), which 
does not necessarily include violence. Thus “crisi” seems to remove the violent 
and long-standing characteristics of the conflict in Ukraine, promoting a less 
serious picture of the situation. 
Both the UKR_Euronews sub-corpora use the noun “crisis” to define the conflict, 
although not as frequently as UKR_RAI sub-corpus. However, if the Italian noun 
“crisi” was not the ideal word for describing the armed conflict in Ukraine, neither 
is “crisis” in English. The OED defines “crisis” (second entry) as follows:  
A vitally important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a turning- 
point; also, a state of affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse 
is imminent; now applied esp. to times of difficulty, insecurity, and suspense 
in politics or commerce.9 
Once again, this does not provide a clear picture of what this “Ukrainian situation” 
entails and has entailed for those involved in it. In the UKR_EuronewsEN sub-
corpus “crisis” and “war” are equally frequent (1.08 fp1000w), whereas “conflict” 
(3.79 fp1000w) is the preferred noun to define the Ukrainian situation. We find an 
almost identical situation in the UKR_EuronewsIT sub-corpus. “Crisi” and 
“guerra” have both very low and similar frequencies (0.53 fp1000w), leaving 
“conflitto” (1.59 fp1000w) as the preferred word indicating the Ukrainian war.  
 
9 "crisis, n.". OED Online. (June 2017). Oxford University Press. Retrieved December 12, 201 
from http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.unibo.it/view/Entry/44539?redirectedFrom=crisis&. 
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4. Conclusion 
The results of this case study suggest that all the broadcasters tended to frame 
the conflict along polarized axes. Actors and places of the conflict are posited 
either on one side or the other: continuums, nuances or scales seem not to find 
any place in the discourse on the Ukrainian situation. 
The corpus-based analysis of actors in the conflict showed that there is a 
tendency to depict two neatly distinct factions: separatists, often addressed as 
“rebels”, and Ukrainians. These factions, in turn, are part of a wider polarisation, 
one between East and West and more specifically between Russia and the West. 
Thus, the label of “new cold war” that Pavlyshin and Fedor10 found among 
Russian media, is not, according to the results of this study, a Russian 
prerogative.  
As mentioned in section 1, I do not have the skills for verifying the existence of 
these narratives and labels in Russian broadcasters, but it would have surely 
been interesting to consider the stance of Russian media. I could have done this 
by adding a component to the AVNews Corpus, which included newscasts from 
another international broadcaster, such as Russia Today11, or by building a 
corpus composed of news bulletins from TASS, the Russian News Agency, or a 
similar bilingual publication within the Russian Federation. However, building 
audiovisual corpora is a very time-consuming activity and analysing the angle 
and stance of Russian media was not among the purposes of this study.  
What this study shows is that the four Western TV broadcasters seem to replicate 
the Russia vs. West polarisation, albeit without mentioning it explicitly and, more 
importantly, by involving the European Union and its leaders as well as the USA. 
This is confirmed also by a brief issued by the European Political Strategy Centre 
in June 2018, which sees the Ukrainian conflict as intimately connected with other 
war-like situations involving power blocks (USA, China, and Russia), thus hinting 
 
10 Monash European and EU Centre, LLCL – The Geopolitics of Eastern Europe Today: The Case 
of Ukraine. (2016, October 23). Retrieved May, 31, 2019, from 
http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/events/events/monash- european-and-eu-centre-llcl-the-
geopolitics-of-eastern-europe-today-the-case-of-ukraine/. 
11 Russia Today website. Retrieved on May, 31, 2019, from https://www.rt.com/. 
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at the return of the so-called “great power rivalry” (EPSC 2018: 8).  
Contrary to the homogeneity found among the broadcasters in the polarized 
discourse on actors within the Ukrainian situation, when it comes to naming the 
conflict itself, I observed different and often incoherent strategies. The two RAI 
broadcasters present contrasting strategies in naming the situation, calling it at 
times “crisi”, at times “guerra” to name just the most frequent options. Arguably, 
the label of “crisi” is a problematic one in Italian and English as it diverts attention 
from the on-going and violent features that, instead, “war” or “conflict” involve. 
Conversely, the BBC employs the two near-synonyms “war” and “conflict”, thus 
giving a more realistic picture of what this conflict entailed and entails for those 
involved. 
Both RAI and BBC on two occasions suggest that what is happening in Ukraine 
is defined as a civil war, confirming Pavlyshyn and Fedor’s (23 October 2016) 
argument. However, the data at my disposal were too scarce to dismiss or 
confirm their argument. The instances labelling the conflict as a civil war were too 
few to draw any firm conclusion, especially if compared to other labels.  
As concerns the Euronews sub-corpora, we find that the labelling of the conflict 
is consistent across the two languages, presenting similar frequencies and 
discursive strategies. Both UKR_Euronews sub-corpora display the label of 
“conflict”/ “conflitto”, showing little variance on a couple of occasions with “war”/ 
“guerra” and “crisis”/ “crisi”. The similarities between these two sub-corpora seem 
to hint at language transfer activities, which are partly confirmed by the brief 
analysis offered while discussing “rebel”/ “ribelli” and “separatists”/ “separatisti”. 
Finally, it is worth reflecting upon the translational implications of the results 
surfaced through the corpus analysis, again by looking at Euronews. Indeed, it 
would be interesting to find out the source language (SL) in which news events 
originated, in order to understand if it is plausible to assume that the 
“original”/source audio-visual texts might be drafted in English, and then 
translated or reworded (Lefevere 1992) by “language journalists” (Baisnée and 
Marchetti 2006) within the Euronews newsroom. 
This, in turn, might explain some similarities found between Euronews (Italian 
23 
and English) and the BBC. Even though those I am drawing are just tentative 
conclusions, the similarities and greater homogeneity observed within this 
channel could lead to the suggestion that maybe they are the result of 
translational activities or, more broadly, multilingual news production.  
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